Speaker: Justin Goodarz, Chief Commercial Officer, Verified Clinical Trials
Key Takeaways
• Self-reported trial history is the one eligibility criterion sites cannot independently verify today.
• VCT puts research-history ineligibility at 7 to 10 per cent of screened participants.
• Obesity, vaccine and neuroscience studies show the highest dual-enrolment prevalence in VCT’s data.
• Close dual-enrolment gaps within single studies and your own portfolio before cross-sponsor risk.
• Build expected research-history ineligibility into sample sizes and into asset due diligence.
When a site coordinator asks a volunteer whether they are already in another clinical trial and the volunteer says no, there is nothing to check the answer against. Weight has a scale, temperature a thermometer and health history an electronic health record (EHR). Research history has only the participant’s own account. “They have to take their word at face value,” Justin Goodarz, Chief Commercial Officer at Verified Clinical Trials (VCT), told the audience at Pharma Clinical Innovation USA 2026 in Philadelphia.
By VCT’s count, the cost of that gap is that ~7 per cent of participants screened for the trials it supports are ineligible based on their research history. Every protocol already excludes dual enrolment and washout-period violations, and later-phase studies often require participants to be naive to the compound, so someone who took part in the Phase II cannot join the Phase III.
Goodarz’s case was that sponsors write these criteria into the protocol and then leave sites with no means of enforcing them. VCT, which by his account has supported more than 10,000 trials with global capabilities, runs a research-history check at screening, and the session set out provide insight into what that check finds.
A protocol rule no site can enforce
Goodarz called dual enrolment “a little bit of a taboo conversation, but a very real issue throughout our industry”, and his starting point was timing.
A site may detect a participant enrolled elsewhere later in a study, but by then the damage is done. “It’s too late by that point. They’ve been dosed multiple times. Got to drop them, got to re-recruit them,” he told the room, describing the result as wasted time and money and a risk to patient safety and data quality. He went further on the stakes: “It’s an outdated model which has proven to be unsuccessful, and studies have failed because of this issue.”
The figures he gave rise with study complexity. In the Phase I units VCT supports, about 18 per cent of participants screening for a trial are ineligible on research history, and in his account the problem compounds in Phase II and III: “More sites, more participants, less oversight, more risk.” In September, VCT verified more than 27,000 participants, of whom ~7 per cent were ineligible. The most common reasons were dual enrolment and an exclusionary health condition and research history. One obesity example was a protocol barring anyone who had been in a prior glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) trial.
The check itself is a single step for the site. The participant signs the study consent and a VCT consent, and staff enter their details into a database that pools every site, study and participant VCT supports. A failure states the reason: enrolment in another sponsor’s study, a screen failure at one site followed by a 50-mile drive to rescreen for the same study at another, or a washout period still running. In the washout case the result gives the date it ends. “So don’t lose that participant, call them back.”
Asked from the floor how the system guards against excluding someone who is in fact eligible, Goodarz maintained there are “not really false positives”, because only a protocol exclusion criterion can trigger a failure and VCT staff can call sites to confirm a participant’s circumstances. On data protection, he pointed to regional servers that keep data in country under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), participant consent, and joint controller arrangements with sites in some countries. “We are not sharing this data, we’re not selling it.”
A later question asked whether the check could work without a site visit. Goodarz confirmed that VCT can support decentralised and remote studies, with one condition worth noting for teams designing those trials. Participants do not register themselves; they are recruited and then entered into the system as what he called the final screening step before moving forward. The check therefore sits inside the sponsor’s screening workflow wherever that workflow happens.
For a clinical operations leader, the practical test is simple. Ask how each study currently confirms that a participant is not enrolled elsewhere or inside a washout window. If the answer is a question on a screening form, the protocol’s exclusion criteria on research history are, in practice, unchecked.
Three motives need one screening answer
Goodarz argued that dual enrolment has a behavioural pattern that varies by phase and therapeutic area, and he sorted participants into three personas: deceptive, desperate, and honest but unaware.
The deceptive participant is the professional volunteer moving between sites and studies for money. “We see this all day, every day.” The desperate participant may have a terminal diagnosis and fear the placebo arm. In Alzheimer’s disease, he explained, some try to enrol twice in the same study to improve their odds of receiving the investigational product (IP), or move to another study, and obesity shows the same pattern. Many participants without health insurance “use research as standard of care”, moving from one sponsor’s vaccine study to another sponsor’s pain study.
“Participant self-reporting is an outdated model which has proven to be unsuccessful, and studies have failed because of this issue.”
The honest but unaware group simply do not know the rules, such as the bar on being in two studies at once or the length of a drug’s washout period. “They complete a study on Monday, enrol in another study on Tuesday, that’s a washout period violation.”
Desperation, Goodarz acknowledged, reaches places the industry would rather not look. He spoke of parents enrolling their children more than once in paediatric studies, and dual enrolment among elderly participants. As sponsors move from a saturated US market into less developed countries, the motive can shift away from the stipend, because “it might be the only meal that the child gets to eat that day”.
The moderator pressed on whether moves to increase participant compensation could raise the incentive to deceive. Goodarz was clear that payment for participants’ time is deserved and called current efforts to remove taxes for research participants a good concept in theory. “But I think that you’re going to see people try to take advantage of that situation, and so it’s going to open up an unanticipated can of worms.”
The personas matter because they rule out the easy fixes. Better participant education would reach the honest but unaware, and tighter stipend rules might deter some professional volunteers, but neither touches a parent or a patient acting out of desperation. A check that runs against the protocol at screening applies regardless of motive, which is why Goodarz framed it as an enhancement to good clinical practice.
Risk clusters where sponsors chase patients
In VCT’s data, obesity has become the leading therapeutic area for research-history ineligibility, which Goodarz put down to “all the hype and competing for the same participants”. Vaccines rank second and neuroscience third, mainly psychiatry, with severe issues also in Alzheimer’s disease. VCT has little experience in oncology or rare disease, he conceded, so its picture there is incomplete. The trend he outlined is that cross-sponsor and cross-phase dual enrolment, washout violations and prior IP exposure concentrate wherever many sponsors target the same participant in one therapeutic area.
He also took on what he called a misconception: that the problem belongs to Florida. Several research sites had told him in recent weeks that sponsors had stopped running trials in the state because of it. “That’s not a solution either.” In his account the issue appears in every city, state and country VCT works in, and the answer is “a top-down approach across all sites in a study, all studies in a portfolio”.
Goodarz acknowledged that VCT does not cover every trial, and his advice to sponsors was to “control what you can control”. That means preventing dual enrolment within a single study first, then across a sponsor’s own portfolio, and only then mitigating cross-sponsor risk. On the portfolio step he was blunt: a sponsor running several obesity studies, or obesity alongside vaccines, likely cannot even detect a participant moving from study A to study B. “But you’ve got to focus on your own studies first and then worry about what everybody else is doing.”
That sequencing is the most usable part of the session for a sponsor. A company with several studies open in obesity or vaccines carries dual-enrolment exposure inside its own portfolio, and closing it requires no industry-wide agreement. Withdrawing from a state moves the exposure elsewhere. Matching participants across one’s own studies at screening removes part of it.
Ineligibility belongs in the sample size
The point Goodarz kept for last may matter most to the people who design trials. Every verification generates data, and he argued that it belongs upstream in protocol design. When teams set a study’s N, the number of participants needed, they rarely account for how many will be ineligible through washout violations, dual enrolment or prior IP exposure.
He worked through a hypothetical. If the protocol violation rate in schizophrenia were 10 per cent, part of that might be dual enrolment and the rest IP exposure or rescreening for the same study. That breakdown, he argued, “gives you insights that you’ve never had before on what is the true N”, along with where prevalence is highest: “Is it South Florida? Is it Chicago? Is it London?”
Sponsors are also taking the data into business development and mergers and acquisitions (M&A), Goodarz reported, benchmarking the most common protocol violations in a therapeutic area. “What is the risk now associated with purchasing this asset or licensing this asset? You factor that into the due diligence.” In his words, the result is “a unique flywheel now between R&D and commercial on the sponsor side”.
On regulators, he noted that agencies do not mandate specific technologies and have lacked visibility into how severe the issue is, so the immediate goal is awareness. He placed the check alongside risk-based quality management (RBQM) rather than in competition with it, borrowing a line he had recently heard: quality by design bakes quality into the ingredients, while RBQM “is making sure the kitchen doesn’t catch on fire”. “It says it in the protocol,” he told the room. “It’s a gap in the screening process without using a technology to prevent this issue.”
Research-history ineligibility is a rate that can be measured, and in obesity, vaccine and neuroscience studies it is high enough to change enrolment targets. A protocol team that sizes its N without it is planning, in effect, to drop and re-recruit participants after they have been dosed. At the next protocol review, ask what share of screened participants the team expects to fail on research history, and how the study would even be able to calculate that number.
human review.
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